Using data from a large German commercial bank, this paper focuses on three key issues in order to analyze the extent of financial advice in individual portfolios. First, we investigate whether collaboration with financial advisors attains to better performing portfolios. Second, we examine the effects of financial advisors on household investment
Introduction
Seeing both advised portfolios devastated by the recent market turmoil and several misselling scandals in the retail finance industry casts some doubts on the competence and honesty of financial advisors. These doubts have triggered a debate as to the merits of financial advice among regulators and politicians that primarily rests on the questions of whether financial advisors create a surplus for private investors, and whether there is a need for more strict regulations in the industry.
Following on the heels of the current political and regulatory discussion, this paper addresses three key questions in order to assess the extent of financial advice in individual portfolios.
First, we ask whether the involvement of advisors attains to better portfolio performance than is the case when individuals manage their portfolios on their own. Second, whether financial advice helps to mitigate the common investment mistakes such as non-participation, excessive trading, risky share inertia or home bias. Third, whether financial advisors provide superior asset allocation recommendations that help their customers to market time. We attempt to answer these questions using a unique data set from a large German commercial bank that records the portfolios, investments and trades of 4,447 randomly selected customer accounts over 34 months for the period between January 2003 to October 2005.
On the one hand, it is conceivable that delegating financial responsibility to professionals would create a surplus for individuals. Particularly, the involvement of financial advisors can attenuate investment mistakes and behavioral biases, lower information search and acquisition costs and lead to a superior asset allocation which, altogether, would improve portfolio performance. On the other hand, employing the services of a financial advisor entails direct costs such as paying higher commissions, fees and loads. As noted by Bergstresser et al. (2009) , brokeredchannel mutual fund customers pay more than twice as much loads and fees as direct-channel customers. Furthermore, the credence good characteristic of financial advice ) and the multidimensional nature of an advisor's task (Inderst and Ottaviani, 2009 ) may elicit financial advisors incentives to abuse their clients, which could induce further (agency) costs. As stressed by Inderst and Ottaviani (2009) , the possibility of abuse and costly incentive problems such as misselling is particularly severe when the advisor is also acting as a direct marketing agent for the financial firm. All in all, based upon arguments on the possible contributions of financial advisors, one might ask whether the the benefits of financial advice dominate its costs (or vice versa), and whether the use of financial advice creates a surplus for individuals. This is, in fact, the underlying question of this paper to which we aim to find an answer by contrasting the advised and self-managed portfolios.
Once the possible endogeneity of making use of financial advice and other investor characteristics are controlled, we find that financial advisors have a negative effect on portfolio performance, and the extent of their negative impact is greater for less-wealthy investors. In particular, an advised customer realizes a lower monthly return of almost 110 basis points (net of transaction costs) in exchange for a 1.21 percentage points higher return volatility relative to a self-directed customer, suggesting that financial advisors might possess limited skills in investment management. Further, we also document that use of financial advice does not attain to a superior dynamic asset allocation. Indeed, self-directed customers display better asset allocation and timing skills using a simple rule of thumb in asset allocation, (100-age), in comparison to their peers who act on the recommendations of professionals. Nevertheless, we identify some benefits of financial advice. Particularly, financial advisors encourage cross-border investments, moderating the home bias. Further, collaboration with advisors lowers trading frequency and account turnover that prevent portfolio churning but end in risky share inertia. As to the latter, it can be conjectured that financial advisors trade off the costs arising from inertia with the costs of churning, and they run the risk of inertia by discouraging intensive trading. This finding can be regarded as an evidence for the notion that advisors adhere to their fiduciary duty, and prevent churning despite their direct pecuniary benefits. Finally, we do not find any evidence of a significant positive or negative effect of advisors on stock market participation rates.
The underlying idea of this paper is similar to the ideas employed in Bergstresser, Chalmers, and Tufano (2009) (hereafter referred to as BCT, 2009 ) who study the possible benefits and costs of brokers in the mutual fund industry, and Hackethal, Haliassos, and Jappelli (2009) (hereafter referred to as HHJ, 2009 ) who analyze the effects of independent financial advisors on individual portfolio performance. However, our work maintains significant advantages over these studies and extends the literature in some important respects. First, compared to HHJ (2009), we go one step further than portfolio performance, investigating the effects of advisors on constituent investment mistakes. In spite of the growing literature on this topic, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper examining explicitly the influence of financial advisors on common investment mistakes of private investors. Second, we complement the literature by investigating the asset allocation recommendations and timing skills of financial advisors.
Third, our results rely on a more representative data set in comparison to discount brokerage data employed by HHJ (2009) or mutual fund data used by BCT (2009), both of which do not necessarily cover the entire population and the total wealth of individuals. Finally, having a rich data set at account level allows us to contrast the advised and self-managed portfolios from different facets, enhancing the robustness and reliability of our results.
In sum, this paper analyzes all the relevant tangible aspects of generic financial advice for individual portfolios. We believe that the questions posed in this paper are highly relevant and insightful not only from an academic standpoint but also from both political and regulatory perspectives.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the possible benefits and costs of financial advice and motivates the empirical work. Section 3 describes data and methodology as well as provides summary statistics. Section 4 reports the main findings, and Section 5 presents the results of robustness tests. Section 6 concludes the paper.
The Role of Financial Advice
In recent years, the greater need to take own provisions for retirement financing as well as the high sophistication of financial markets have imposed on households greater responsibility to actively manage their personal finances. However, as there is ample evidence that private investors are financially illiterate (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007) , lack information (Guiso and Jappelli, 2006) and possess behavioral biases (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Huberman et al., 2007) , doubts arise in regard to financial capability of individuals. As a means of solving these deficits, financial advice is proposed as a remedy in conjunction with financial literacy education and default options whereas financial advice alone is the prevalent recipe among individuals (Allen, 2001; Fisher and Gerhardt, 2007) . We discuss in the following the possible benefits and costs of financial advice and motivate the empirical work.
Even though basic finance theories postulate that information is costless and available to all market participants, from a practical point of view these assumptions are violated. Indeed, information is costly to process, and individuals mostly rely on noisy sources which provide scarce and low-quality information which leads to making suboptimal investment choices (McCall, 1970) . At this juncture the involvement of professionals can add value to individuals by lowering the information costs as they have the ability to exploit economies of scale in information search and acquisition processes. Hence, compared to self-directed investors, advised investors can enjoy more and better information at lower costs which may improve their portfolio performance (Peress, 2004) .
Another potential contribution of professionals is providing investment recommendations that outperform/time the market. Ever since Cowles (1933) , numerous empirical studies have been carried out to ascertain whether professionals could outperform/time the market. From an academic perspective, posing such a question is especially interesting as it asserts that professionals possess informational advantage, and thus, it challenges the efficient market hypothesis. Womack (1996) who analyzes stock recommendations of fourteen major US brokerage houses, documents that professionals display ability in stock picking and market timing. The securities which are recommended to buy or to sell move in the same direction as predicted by the analysts, both in the 3-day time interval and in the postrecommendation period. In a similar study, Desai and Jain (1995) examine the investment advice of the 'Wall Street Superstar' money managers who participate in the Barron's Annual Roundtable. Their results imply that recommendations of money managers earn abnormal returns within a period of about fourteen days, however, in the longer holding term, i.e. 1 to 3 years, average abnormal returns go to zero.
Examples from the literature which investigate the forecasting abilities of professionals can be further extended. However, to the best of our knowledge, no paper has so far analyzed the effects of advisors on the dynamic asset allocation decisions of private investors. We therefore complement the literature by addressing the question of whether collaboration with advisors leads to displaying superior dynamic asset allocation in terms of adjusting portfolio weights among asset classes prior to future realizations of the market.
There is also ample evidence that private investors behave irrationally and deviate consistently from ideal investment behavior (e.g. Campbell, 2006; Calvet et al., 2006) . Such deviations are costly, and thus, induce welfare and utility losses for individuals. In this environment, an investor can benefit from making use of financial advice as advisors can attenuate the non-trivial costs that stem from judgmental misperceptions and investment mistakes of individuals. There is also evidence that supports the hypothesis that professionals are more immune to behavioral biases and less subject to investment mistakes in comparison to lay investors. For instance, Shapira and Venezia (2001) find that disposition effect (i.e. tendency to sell winning stocks too early and losing stocks too late) is less pronounced for professionals. Feng and Seasholes (2005) also document that trading experience and financial sophistication are of substantial importance in limiting investor biases, which supports the findings of Shapira and Venezia (2001) . Further, financial advice can contribute to overcome the non-participation phenomenon: Advisors can help their clients to overcome the barriers to stockholding both by bridging the information asymmetries as well as eliminating the misperceptions as to stock market (Kramer, 2009 ). Yet, there is no evidence that confirms the positive relationship between making use of financial advice and participation rates. In this respect, our paper contributes to the literature by investigating the effects of financial advisors on stock market participation.
Finally, it is conceivable that financial advisors direct their clients towards a more international portfolio and confine home bias as they can eliminate the implicit barriers such as information asymmetries or political risks, both of which are attributed to home bias (Kang and Stulz, 1995) .
Nevertheless, the delegation of portfolio decisions also entails direct (i.e. commissions, loads) and indirect costs (i.e. agency costs) which can partially, or even fully, offset the discussed benefits of financial advisors. Recall that the interaction between a financial advisor and his client is subject to agency relationship, and given the fact that all people are self-interested and have their own preferences, it is also conceivable that 'informed' advisors can face incentives to exploit their 'uninformed' customers. For instance, the multitasking of advisors (Inderst and Ottaviani, 2009 ) as well as the credence good characteristic of financial advice can lead to opportunistic behavior of advisors.
1 In particular, advisors could direct their customers to high-commission products which, however, may not match their particular needs -an incentive problem known as misselling (Inderst and Ottaviani, 2009 ). In recent years, a number of misselling scandals such as mortgage endowment or precipice bond misselling in the UK or Lehman 'certificates' misselling in Germany, have occurred which have bestowed huge losses on private investors, all of which underpin the concern of misselling. 2 Further, as the compensation of advisors partly hinges on the purchases and of their clients, the advisors can face incentives to higher the portfolio turnover instead of limiting portfolio churning. Whether they act consistent with their pecuniary incentives and encourage trading, or adhere to their fiduciary duty and attenuate churning is an empirical question which we also address in the next section.
1 In our context we consider advisors who operate and give advice to clients on behalf of a single financial firm. In this environment the task of an advisor has a multidimensional nature: providing both adequate and high-quality advice to the customer, and acting as a direct marketing agent for the financial firm.
2 Not only the customers but also the financial firms to which the financial advisors are tied could suffer from the opportunistic behavior of their agents. In particular, financial firms can face agency costs in the form of losing reputation, paying high indemnities to the affected customers or even losing their certificates when their agents practice misselling (Inderst and Ottaviani, 2009) . Taking into account the interaction between financial advisors, financial firms and customers, we can speak of the existence of a trilateral dilemma (Jackson, 2005) .
Data and Methodology

Data and Descriptive Statistics
The primary data set for this research is information from a large German commercial bank on portfolio holdings and investments of 10,434 randomly selected customers for the 34-month period from January 2003 to October 2005. We have for each customer in the sample key demographic and investor-type data; portfolio holdings, purchases and sales information recorded by asset category as well as a variable that indicates the intensity of reliance on financial advice during the observation period.
3 For the remainder of the paper, an advised customer is defined as an investor who makes use of financial advice at least once during the sample period. In addition to the bank data we also employ a secondary data set, destatis, which is procured by the German Federal Statistical Office. This data set provides structural information such as gross domestic product, disposable income and voter participation rates for the German regions. We use these variables as instruments in order to cope with the problem of endogeneity which we elaborately discuss later in this section.
Although each customer of the bank with an investment account is assigned to a financial advisor at the local branch, it is not mandatory for the customers to consult the professionals for each investment decision. However, when a customer (irrespective of whether advised or self-directed) places an order via internet, phone or fax in the system, the bank's information system shows this order to the corresponding advisor who can make an entry whether this order hinges on a recommendation made by him or not. Indeed, financial advisors also have the option of not making any entries. If a bank advisor prefers not to make any entry, this makes it unclear as to whether the order placed by the customer is related to the recommendations of the bank's advisors or not. Due to this unclarity, we drop 5,444 customer accounts without any entry about financial advice which gives us a sample of 4,990 accounts. We drop further 543 accounts due to missing data on the zip codes of residence and regional variables. Finally, we have a total of 4,447 customer accounts in our final sample. Table 1 and Table 2 present summary statistics on the demographics and sample size from our data set. As shown in the tables, the average customer in our sample is 54.46 years old and has an average portfolio value of 45,297 Euro. Almost 38 percent of the bank's customers are occupied as employees and the share of blue-collar workers and retirees are 2.7 and 19.7 percent, respectively. As to the tendency of reliance on financial advice, we observe that 62.8 percent of the customers consult advisors at least once during the sample period whereas almost 43 percent of them fully delegate portfolio decisions to professionals. The latter statistic is especially interesting as it again underlines the importance of financial advice on household investment decisions.
To obtain a picture of individuals' investment behavior, we next present the portfolio compositions of customers who are aggregated as advised and self-directed. As shown in Table 2 , a self-directed customer holds on average 29.7 percent of account volume in single stocks, 8.2 percent in bonds, 37.3 percent in mutual funds, 2.7 percent in warrants and 14.7 percent in cash and cash-equivalent products whereas an advised customer invests on average only 11.8 percent of portfolio volume in single stocks, 10 percent in bonds, 57.6 percent in mutual funds, 5.7 percent in warrants and 6.2 percent in cash and cash-equivalent products. In sum, the univariate statistics suggest that advised customers on average invest more conservatively where they have lower equity exposure and better diversified portfolios.
Measuring Portfolio Performance
A traditional and widely-accepted way of evaluating portfolio performance is the mean-variance analysis by Markowitz (1952) . This approach suggests that the first two moments of returns, mean and variance, have the power to evaluate the overall portfolio performance meaningfully (Elton et al., 2003) . We therefore rely on this approach in analyzing the effects of financial advice on portfolio performance and assume that the basic assumptions of this procedure also hold for our sample.
Portfolio returns are measured on a monthly basis; therefore, an assumption for the timing of transactions should be made. As in Dietz (1968) , we also assume that all transactions occur in the middle of a given month and compute the monthly portfolio returns net of direct transaction costs (i.e. commissions) using the Dietz measure:
where R it represents the net monthly return in month t; V it is the change market value of portfolio at the end of month t; P it and S it represent the cumulated purchases and sales in month t, respectively; and E it is the cash proceeds from dividends, coupons, etc at the end of month t. compared, we observe that advised portfolios still have a lower mean log return than selfmanaged portfolios (.0062 vs .0096 percent). Interestingly, in net terms both customer groups underperform the benchmark index; DAX (German Stock Index), however, the sample mean of gross log returns on self-managed portfolios is almost as high as the market portfolio, suggesting that self-directed customers tend to have similar portfolios to the market portfolio.
One might argue that advisors lead to lower returns as they seek to reduce portfolio risk.
If this is the case, advised portfolios can still be efficient in spite of the lower returns, and thus, the added value of advisors to account performance could be positive. Although there are several measures to estimate risk, portfolio risk is computed as the variance of log returns.
Nevertheless, as shown in Table 1 , the return volatility of advised portfolios is slightly higher than the self-directed portfolios (.0047 vs .0045). This finding suggests that financial advisors contemporaneously lower returns and higher risk, implying that financial advisors might possess narrow skills in investment management.
In order to complete the picture, we finally contrast the Sharpe ratios of advised and selfmanaged portfolios. Consistent with the reported univariate statistics on portfolio risk and return, self-directed customers realize on average higher Sharpe ratio in comparison to advised customers (.425 vs. .266).
In short, univariate statistics suggest that use of financial advice is not associated with better portfolio performance than is the case when the individuals manage their accounts on their own.
It is however possible that observed differences in portfolio performance are not only due to the contributions of financial advisors but also to the differences in household characteristics of selfdirected and advised customers. In order to clarify this issue, we now turn to the econometric analysis in which we control for the household and financial characteristics of investors.
Econometric Issues
Before turning to the findings, a number of technical issues in the econometric analysis need to be addressed. First, making use of financial advice can be motivated by the poor account performance of investors (HHJ, 2009) . If this argument holds, any regression with the ordinary least squares (OLS) method would yield inconsistent estimates since zero conditional mean of error term assumption, E(u i /x i ) = 0, is violated. In other words, the OLS estimates would be misleading due to the arising endogeneity issue. We therefore assume that the use of financial advice is determined simultaneously along with portfolio performance. Accordingly, the Durbin-Wu-Hausmann test for endogeneity validates this a-priori assumption. In order to cope with the problem of endogeneity, we instrument the endogenous financial advice dummy by using regional variables such as number of bank branches, mean voter participation rate to federal elections and log disposable income in the region. The rationale behind choosing these instruments is that they are correlated with the endogenous regressor but they do not directly explain the dependent variable. For instance, the overidentifying restriction test that we carried out after each regression confirms the validity of our instruments. Second, we use the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation (Hansen, 1982) with robust standard errors in lieu of a simple instrumental variable estimation as it has been found out that error variance terms are not i.i.d. 4 As noted by Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman (2002) , the GMM estimator is more efficient than the simple IV estimator in the presence of heteroskedasticity.
Finally, the observations are clustered by bank branches in order to correct the standard errors that can be affected by the cross-sectional correlation within the sample (Petersen, 2009 ).
Results
Portfolio Performance and Financial Advice
In this section, we investigate whether financial advisors contribute to yield better portfolio performance than is the case when individuals manage their accounts on their own. As noted earlier, we rely on the mean-variance analysis by Markowitz (1952) in evaluating the portfolio performance of customers.
We first address the question of whether financial advice helps to improve portfolio returns.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 regress the net log monthly returns on the instrumented finan- 4 We have computed Pagan-Hall test for heteroskedasticity, and the results indicate that heteroskedasticity, E(u
cial advice dummy and other control variables such as gender, wealth, age and occupation of investors.
Endogeneity-corrected regression confirms the pattern shown in the univariate analysis, indicating a statistically significant negative effect of financial advisors on portfolio returns, regardless of controlling for wealth or not. In particular, an advised portfolio exhibits a monthly return of almost 110 basis points lower than a self-managed portfolio. When we control for other investor characteristics, risk aversion is found to have a negative effect on returns that is consistent with the willingness of individuals to taking lower risk. Moreover, wealthier investors tend to realize higher returns than their peers with less wealth. This supports the notion that high wealth investors pay information costs, and obtain more and better information that leads to realizing higher returns (Peress, 2004) . Other investor characteristics, inter alia age, gender and occupation do not show any significant effect on portfolio returns.
One potential explanation for the observed negative contribution of financial advisors on portfolio returns might be the fees and commissions charged for advisory services, suggesting that direct costs of financial advice overcompensate its possible added value. Accordingly, this gives rise to the further question of whether advisory commissions are too high, and if financial advisory services should be more strictly regulated (HHJ, 2009) . In order to shed light on this issue, in an unreported regression, raw portfolio return which is computed before deducting any advisory fees and commissions is regressed on instrumented financial advice dummy and other control variables. The results show that the direct cost argument for realized lower returns fails to receive empirical evidence: Advised portfolios underperform in gross terms the self-managed portfolios as well, implying that financial advisors may have narrow skills in investment management.
However, as yet, only the first moment of portfolio returns is explored. It can be conjectured that use of financial advice contributes to lower returns because of advisors' desire to achieve smaller portfolio risk. We therefore next explore the effect of financial advice on overall portfolio risk which is captured by the variance of returns. As shown in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3, we find evidence of a significant positive effect of financial advisors on portfolio risk. In other words, advised investors face higher return volatility compared to their self-directed peers.
This finding is in line with univariate statistics and raises further doubts about the abilities of financial advisors as making use of financial advice ends up in lower returns and higher risk.
Controlling for other variables, portfolios of older (age 60+) and more risk averse individuals display lower risk whereas male investors face higher return volatility relative to females which confirms the positive effect of male gender on risk taking as predicted by the literature (Barber and Odean, 2001 ). Wealth has a significant moderating effect, indicating that wealthier investors face lower return volatility. Including wealth proxy in the regression eliminates the statistical significance of older age and risk aversion dummies (conservative dummy), suggesting that these variables partly proxy wealth.
Finally, we investigate the effects of financial advisors and other investor characteristics on Sharpe ratio. Sharpe ratio is defined for 3,116 out of 4,447 investors since not all of the investors in the sample hold risky assets. The GMM estimation shows that the coefficient of financial advice dummy is negative and statistically different than zero at the 1 percent level, regardless of controlling for wealth or not. This finding is in line with our findings on the effects of financial advisors on portfolio returns and risk. Similarly, being male has also a negative effect on portfolio performance presumably because male investors face higher return volatility as shown in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 . Risk aversion of investors is found to have a positive effect on portfolio performance. Finally, the regression results indicate that wealth of investors has a positive significant effect on Sharpe ratio. However, when we include the wealth proxy in the regression, we observe that significance of risk aversion dummies disappears whereas magnitude of financial advice dummy decreases but retains its significance.
All in all, our examination of portfolio performance of advised and self-managed portfolios fails to provide evidence that financial advisors have a positive contribution to individual portfolio performance. Indeed, advised customers realize lower returns, face higher risk, and thus, achieve lower Sharpe ratio in comparison to self-directed customers.
Investment Mistakes and Financial Advice
Even though collaboration with financial advisors does not end up in better portfolio performance, their possible positive contributions to their customers might fall in other dimensions such as attenuation of investment mistakes. We therefore next investigate the effects of financial advisors on four common investment mistakes, i.e. non-participation, diversification, excessive trading and risky share inertia.
Non-Participation
We define an investor as a participant in cases where the share of publicly traded stocks or stock mutual funds held in the portfolio is positive. To obtain an impression about the stockholding behavior of sampled customers, we first report the univariate statistics for participation. In the sample of 4,447 customers, almost 72 percent hold equities either directly or indirectly. Of the participants, 42.54 percent hold both single stocks and stock mutual funds, 24.41 percent hold only individual stocks while the remaining 33.05 percent invest only in stock mutual funds.
A-priori, it is conceivable that financial advisors would encourage individuals to invest in stocks since they are aware of the positive equity premium, and equities are high margin products. On the other hand, advisors could also deter their clients from the stock market as they intend to limit the possible legal and reputational risks which might arise from speculative equity investments. Table 4 reports the endogeneity corrected Probit regression results. As shown in the table, we do not find any evidence of a significant negative or positive effect of advisors on stock market participation although the estimated coefficient has a negative sign. Apart from the main variable of interest, participation probability tends to be lower for more risk averse investors (very safe and safe) which is in line with the findings of literature (e.g. Haliassos and Bertaut, 1995; Vissing-Jorgensen, 2000) . Employees and executive employees are more likely to hold stocks compared to the omitted occupational group, students, which can be argued with their better access to relevant information for stock investments. Likewise, male investors tend to hold more stocks compared to female investors. Being older also increases the participation probability. In particular, older investors (45<age≤60) hold directly/indirectly stocks with a 20.2 percentage points higher probability compared to younger investors (age≤18) when all the other variables in the regression are held constant at their means. In Column 2, wealth proxy is included in the regression. Akin to the findings of literature, participation rate increases with the wealth of investors. In particular, a 1 percent rise in wealth increases the participation probability by almost 10 percentage points. This result also provides evidence for the notion of fixed participation and transaction cost arguments to explain stockholding puzzle (VissingJorgensen, 2000).
As a whole, in spite of the theoretical predictions, we find no evidence of a significant effect of financial advisors on participation probability. Indeed, future research may have more success in explaining the effects of financial advice on participation by investigating whether financial advisors tend to convert non-participants to participants.
Home Bias
Besides non-participation, another common investment anomaly of private investors is the lack of international diversification. Although investments in foreign securities offer investors considerable gains, empirical studies show that private investors hold almost all of their wealth in domestic assets (French and Poterba, 1991; Grauer and Hakansson, 1987) . Nevertheless, financial advisors can contribute to holding more internationally diversified portfolios as they can help their clients to overcome the barriers to foreign investments. To address this concern, international diversification that is proxied by the share of foreign securities relative to overall portfolio holdings is regressed on mean advisory intensity variable and other control variables.
5 Table 5 reports the estimation results.
Regardless of controlling for wealth, the estimated coefficient for making use of financial advice is positive and statistically highly significant. This implies that financial advisors increase the share of international securities, and thus, home bias is less pronounced for the advised portfolios. One might suggest that financial advisors encourage cross-border investments presumably because they receive higher sales commissions for promoting foreign securities. However, as noted by , international orders are not much more profitable than domestic orders which undermines this view. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that When we control for other variables, we observe that male investors tend to be internationally better diversified than female investors while older individuals (age 60+) are less likely to hold foreign securities in their portfolios in comparison to younger investors. These findings confirm the earlier empirical findings of the existing literature (Graham et al., 2005) . Moreover, wealthier investors hold a higher foreign securities share which underpins the transactions (Brennan, 1975) and information costs (Merton, 1987) explanations for home bias.
All in all, financial advisors direct their clients towards a more international portfolio, limiting the home bias. Even though international diversification is associated with manifold gains, potential benefits may be offset by the arising exchange rate exposure if the portfolio is 5 In the Tobit and Probit regressions we employ advisory intensity instead of financial advice dummy since endogeneity-corrected Tobit and Probit estimations assume that endogenous regressor is a continuous variable. Advisory intensity is computed as the proportion of advised trades relative to all trades during the sample period.
not hedged against this particular risk. As large fraction of private investors is not aware of exchange risk and do not hedge it efficiently , this might also partly explain the higher return volatility of advised accounts.
Trading Frequency and Portfolio Turnover
We next turn to the effects of financial advisors on the trading behavior of individuals. Even though rational investors should trade until the net gains of transaction equals its marginal costs (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1982) , private investors, in particular discount brokerage customers, trade intensively. Excessive trading is described as an investment mistake as it yields poor portfolio performance mainly because of the arising trading costs (Barber and Odean, 2000) .
Yet, collaboration with financial advisors might limit excessive trading and related costs that can partially or even fully compensate the commissions and fees charged for advisory services.
We first explore the effects of financial advisors on trading frequency. In Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 , the monthly average number of transactions is regressed on the instrumented financial advice dummy and other control variables. Contrary to the presumed pecuniary incentives of advisors, use of financial advice contributes to a lower transactions number. When we control for other covariates, investors who are employed as executives tend to trade more often. Likewise, male, older and wealthier investors also trade more frequently in comparison to female, younger and less wealthy investors, a fact that can be argued with the competence effect (Heath and Tversky, 1991) . In particular, these investors perceive themselves as more competent, and thus, overestimate their beliefs and signals in the market which leads to a higher trading frequency (Graham et al., 2005) .
It is, however, noteworthy that sales commissions of advisors do not solely depend on the number of transactions but rather they hinge on the volume of trades. Consequently, financial advisors may lower the number of transactions but still increase the turnover of portfolios to obtain higher commissions. We therefore now turn to the effects of financial advisors on account turnover. Following Barber and Odean (2001) , turnover is computed as the sum of one-half of monthly purchase turnover and one-half of monthly sales turnover.
6 As shown in Table 6 , we find evidence of a significant negative effect of financial advisors on portfolio turnover regardless of controlling for wealth or not. This result underpins the hypothesis that financial advisors adhere to their fiduciary duty, and prevent excessive trading and churning in spite of their direct monetary incentives. Surprisingly, wealth of investors has a negative effect on portfolio turnover, albeit the effect of a 1 percentage increase tends to be very slight. Investors who follow balanced and conservative investment strategies tend to have higher account turnovers whereas other investor characteristics such as gender, age or occupation do not show any significant effect on account turnover.
Portfolio Inertia
Basic portfolio theories posit that rational investors would periodically rebalance their portfolios to maintain their risk profile in response to market fluctuations (Bilias et al., 2009 ). Yet, empirical evidence indicates that investors do not alter the risky assets regularly and individual portfolios display inertia in risky assets (Campbell, 2006) . Given this fact, we next investigate whether financial advisors direct their customers to alter their portfolios regularly as presumed by the orthodox theory.
To address this concern, risky share inertia is proxied by monthly absolute value changes of risky assets in levels as described in Calvet et al. (2009) and Vissing-Jorgensen (2000) . Following
Carroll (2000), risky assets are defined as the sum of single stocks, stock mutual funds, realestate funds, warrants and derivatives. 7 Absolute value change in risky assets can be driven either by active trades of investor or by returns on risky securities (Calvet et al., 2008) . Hence, we disaggregate the absolute value change into two components: (i) active changes, and (ii) passive changes; and regress the active component on the instrumented financial advice dummy and remaining control variables. Table 7 reports the GMM estimation results.
Our results imply that advised investors tend to alter their portfolios less frequently than self-directed customers, suggesting that advised portfolios display more risky share inertia.
This result is in fact plausible when we recall our findings on trading frequency and turnover of advised customers. Taking both findings together, one can suggest that financial advisors trade off the costs arising from excessive trading with the costs of portfolio inertia, and they run the risk of inertia by lowering trading frequency in order to avoid portfolio churning and associated costs. Further, advised investors might rebalance their portfolios less regularly partly due to the higher mutual fund share in their portfolios. Particularly, having higher mutual fund share in the portfolio may reflect scope for rebalancing the portfolios less frequently at lower costs. The regression also confirms the predicted positive effect of wealth on rebalancing, implying that the transaction cost argument might have the potential for explaining inertia. Furthermore, an individual is more likely to rebalance the portfolio if she is more risk averse. Likewise, investors who are occupied as executive employee tend to alter their portfolios more frequently, and finally, inertia is also less pronounced for older (age 60+) investors in comparison to their younger peers.
Asset Allocation, Timing and Financial Advice
Another extent to which financial advisors might positively contribute is by providing superior asset allocation recommendations that help the customers to market-time (BCT, 2009). Put differently, advisors could raise (lower) the portfolio weights among asset classes prior to a rise (fall) in the market (Bollen, 2001) . If financial advisors have the ability to forecast correctly the future market realizations, advised customers can enjoy abnormal returns in comparison to self-directed customers.
We investigate the asset allocation recommendations of financial advisors at aggregate level following the informal procedure suggested by BCT (2009) . In this methodology, three asset classes (equities, bonds and cash) are assumed to represent the entire portfolio. 8 Accordingly, the portfolio weights of these assets are calibrated. For each asset class, the relevant benchmark index is used in order to isolate the possible effects of security selection. For instance, MSCI World Index, Barclays European Aggregate Bond Index and monthly Euribor rates are employed as benchmark indexes for equity, fixed income and cash investments, respectively.
Customer portfolios are classified as advised and self-managed at aggregate level, and the monthly portfolio asset weights are calculated correspondingly. To evaluate the market timing abilities of customers and the influence of financial advisors, we compare, at aggregate level, the cumulative value of 1 Euro over 34 months invested in the beginning of the observation period, and rebalanced regularly each month. Figure 1 presents the cumulative wealth in the sample period both for advised and selfdirected customers. The results indicate that asset allocation of self-directed customers lead to a higher cumulative wealth in comparison to the asset allocation of advised customers (1.28
Euro vs. 1.05 Euro). When the mean monthly excess returns of aggregated portfolios are contrasted, we observe that self-managed portfolios realize 77 basis points while self-directed investors achieve 16 basis points excess return per month. Similarly, when the volatility of returns is considered, and risk adjustment has been carried out, we see that self-managed portfolios produce higher Sharpe ratios than advised portfolios (.44 versus .082 per month). As a whole, these results provide evidence that the involvement of financial advisors does not attain to a superior asset allocation which could also partly explain the moderating effect of advisors on portfolio performance. More interestingly, self-directed customers display better dynamic asset allocation following a very simple rule of thumb, namely 100-age rule. As illustrated in Figure 2 and 3, non-advised customers tend to act on this rule whereas advised customers seem not to follow it. This implies that a very well-known simple rule of thumb conquers the asset allocation recommendations of professionals, questioning the advisors' expert skills.
Robustness Checks
We verify the robustness of our results to alternative measures of financial advice dummy and investment mistakes. First, we repeat our analysis using an alternative financial advice dummy.
We specify the median value of advisory intensity variable (.406) as a breakpoint, and define the customers above the 50th. percentile as advised and the rest as self-directed customers.
The results imply that the main variable of interest, financial advice dummy, hardly changes in magnitude but retains the significance in every estimation, indicating that our results are robust to alternative financial advice dummy. Second, we disaggregate the portfolio risk into systematic and unsystematic components to test the effects of financial advice on these risk measures.
While there is no evidence of a significant effect of financial advisors on systematic risk, we find a positive effect of financial advice on unsystematic risk. This confirms our findings that financial advisors have overall a negative effect on portfolio performance, irrespective of how the portfolio risk is computed. In the examination of the link between financial advice and portfolio turnover, we employ purchase turnover as an alternative measure. The rationale behind using this variable is that advisors obtain sales commissions for the purchases of their clients, and hence, they can face incentives to inflate this ratio rather than sales turnover. Nevertheless, measuring portfolio turnover as an absolute value of all security purchases over lagged portfolio value eliminates the significance of financial advice dummy. Finally, we estimate each model using the robust estimator of GMM to weak instrument problem (continuously-updated estimator)
since weak instrument problem can induce serious problems such as inconsistency of estimators or finite sample bias. We find that the coefficient of financial advice dummy changes very little in magnitude and retains significance, implying that our findings are not affected by the possible weak instrument problem. Indeed, it is noteworthy that there are some changes in the significance and magnitude of some control variables.
Conclusion
In this paper we attempt to shed light on the role of financial advisors in individual portfolios.
Our empirical evidence uncovers important interactions between financial advice and individual portfolios. The econometric analysis that controls for investor characteristics and endogeneity of making use of financial advice implies that collaboration with financial advisors lowers portfolio returns, increases portfolio risk, and thus, ends up in lower risk-adjusted returns (Sharpe ratio) than is the case when individuals manage their investments on their own. This finding casts some doubt on the skills of professionals in investment management. Further, we also document that involvement of advisors does not lead to a superior dynamic asset allocation that time the market. Indeed, self-directed customers who tend to follow a simple rule of thumb in asset allocation display better timing skills than their peers who act on the recommendations of professionals. Nevertheless, our study also identifies some benefits of financial advice. Particularly, use of financial advice moderates home bias and limits intensive trading. Even though advisors prevent portfolio churning, we find that advised investors rebalance their portfolios less frequently than self-directed customers and their portfolios display inertia in risky assets.
Finally, we do not find any evidence of a significant negative or positive effect of advisors on stock market participation.
As a whole, evidence abounds that financial advice lacks quality in some tangible dimensions. Considering the ongoing discussion on enhancing the quality of financial advice, our results have two implications for policy and for financial practice: First, even though recent regulatory developments (e.g. MiFID) aim to elaborate the quality of financial advice by improving the transparency between customers and advisors, our findings suggest that regulators should primarily focus on the question of how to enhance the qualifications and skills of financial advisors. Second, we partly discuss how the monetary incentives of advisors affect their behavior, suggesting that financial firms should also take on responsibility for improving the quality of financial advice. Particularly, financial firms can make use of alternative incentive structures such as contingent performance-based commissions in lieu of sales commissions in order to ensure that their advisors act in the best interest of the customers and provide them with high-quality advice. In other words, the advisory dimension of a financial advisor's task should be prioritized compared to the salesman duty.
Overall, we provide a first step in understanding the influence of financial advice on individual portfolios in several facets. The findings presented suggest that further research on this topic is worthwhile. For instance, we partly discuss the role of financial advisors in mitigating investment mistakes; however, further and detailed investigation on the effects of financial advisors on household investment mistakes appears to be promising. All Advised Port. Self-managed Port.
All Advised Port. Self-managed Port.
Dependent Variables
Log Returns Note: The table presents the endogeneity-corrected Probit estimates of owning directly / indirectly stocks. We employ advisory intensity variable instead of financial advice dummy since discrete endogeneous regressor is not appropriate. The marginal effects are reported rather than original probit estimates. The following variables are used (at the zip code level) to instrument the financial advice dummy: log disposable income, number of bank branches and voter participation rate to federal elections. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. Three stars denote significance at 1 percent or less; two stars denote significance at 5 percent or less; one star denotes significance at 10 percent or less. Note: The table presents the endogeneity corrected Tobit estimates using the following instruments for financial advice at the zip code level: log disposable income, number of bank branches and voter participation rate to federal elections. We employ advisory intensity variable instead of financial advice dummy since discrete endogeneous regressor is not appropriate. Marginal effects are reported rather than original Tobit coefficients. International diversification is proxied by the share of international securities in the portfolio. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. Three stars denote significance at 1 percent or less; two stars denote significance at 5 percent or less; one star denotes significance at 10 percent or less. Note: The table presents the GMM estimates of trading frequency and monthly turnover rate. The following variables are employed (at the zip code level) to instrument the financial advice dummy: log disposable income, number of bank branches and voter participation rate to federal elections. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. Three stars denote significance at 1 percent or less; two stars denote significance at 5 percent or less; one star denotes significance at 10 percent or less. 
